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Goffman’s Biography and the Interaction Order:  
A Study in Biocritical Hermeneutics 
Dmitri N. Shalin 
 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Sociological Association in Boston, August 1, 2008. 
 
In these matters, American Hippies, and later, “The Chicago  
Seven,” were interesting amateurs; the great terrorists of  
contact forms were the mid-17th century Quakers of Britain. . . .  
That sturdy band of plain speakers should always stand before  
us as an example of the wonderfully disruptive power of  
systematic impoliteness, reminding us once again of the  
vulnerabilities of the interaction order. There is no doubt:  
Fox’s disciples raised to the monumental heights the art of  
becoming the pain in the ass. 
Erving Goffman 
 
If we list the various claims (both substantiated and the  
other kind) that have been made against Goffman – cynical, 
ironical, duplicitous, deceptive, unserious, nonresponsive –  
we find they are also the key terms in Sartre’s analysis of  
‘bad faith’. It seems that Goffman took Sartre so much to  
heart that he assembled a persona for himself exactly on the  
model of ‘Sartrean bad faith’, perhaps in the belief that a  
double negative makes a positive, that is, if he could only  
mock up bad faith maybe he, at least, could escape the  
determinism he describes so well. Certainly there is  
evidence in his comportment that Goffman was more  






This paper examines the interfaces between Erving Goffman’s 
biography and theory.  It rests on the premise that 
Goffman’s Behavior in Public Places can be profitably explored in 
light of Goffman’s behavior in public places, and vice versa.  The 
tentative conclusion I have reached after examining available 
biographical accounts is that Goffman was a student of civility 
whose standards he flouted, that his demeanor was sometimes 
intentionally demeaning, his deference willfully deferred, and his 
incivility painfully obvious to those present.  The argument is made 
that Goffman’s infringements on the interaction order were 
strategic, systematic, theoretically significant, and worthy of close 
study by interactionist sociologists.   
 
Exploratory in nature, this study is designed to make the case for 
biocritical hermeneutics – an offshoot of pragmatist sociology that 
focuses on the embodied social forms and biographical 
underpinnings of sociological inquiry (Shalin 2007).  It uses the 
resources of the Intercyberlibrary (see the reference section for 
URL), an online collection highlighting the works and avocational 
pursuits of interactionist sociologists.  The library houses The Erving 
Goffman Project that features biographical materials on Goffman 
and promotes biographical methods in social science.   
 
After situating the present venture in a larger body of scholarship 
on the interfaces of biography and social science, I review the 
biographical sources available for this study and examine the 
difficulties in applying biographical methods to Goffman’s 
work.  Next, I analyze the (dis)continuties in Goffman the scholar, 
the teacher, the man, and discuss their implications for the 
interaction order theory.  I conclude with a few thoughts on The 
Erving Goffman Project and the prospects for biocritical research. 
Biographical Research and Pragmatist Hermeneutics 
 
There is a long-standing tradition in social science that investigates 
the relationship between biography and society.  In the last two 
decades, social scientists have increasingly focused on the interplay 
between biographical narratives and the larger social context within 
which members of society seek self-understanding.  Dan Goodley 
and his associates go as far as to label our time “a biographical age” 
(Goodley et al, 2004; see also Petrovskaya 2003; Roberts 2002; 
Shanahan and Macmillan 2008; Zissner 2004).  We can glean this 
biographical turn in the rapidly expanding list of published 
biographies, the emergence of web sites devoted to biographical 
research and book stores specializing in biographical materials. 
 
Social scientists working in this tradition converge on the premise 
that society’s history unfolds through the ongoing self-construction 
of its members while (auto)biographical accounts draw on the 
narrative constructs and life-cycle resources available in a given 
historical period.  While biographical explorations focus on 
biographical and autobiographical statements circulating in various 
social strata, they are less centrally concerned with the embodied 
forms of self-framing and the word-body-action nexus.   
 
The problem with self-construction is that it is subject to self-
sampling error inherent in sampling by anecdote and validation 
through hearsay.  Present in all biographical narratives, this 
difficulty is particularly evident in autobiographical reconstructions 
whose protagonists rummage through their own lives looking for 
episodes that express the author’s evolving sense of agency.  The 
reader is usually left uncertain as to how representative a given 
sample of anecdotes is, how the incongruent strands of enselfments 
hang together and whether they form a coherent whole.  The 
inauspicious biographical events can be cast as older selves the 
agent passed through on the way to an authentic selfhood (St. 
Augustine’s youthful indiscretions), explained away as 
uncharacteristic slips (Mel Gibson moments), or edited out 
altogether as ill-suited for the chosen narrative arc (Nixon’s 
animosity toward Jews).  
 
Biocritical hermeneutics, by contrast, examines self-framing as a 
somatic-affective-discursive process marked by indeterminacy and 
creativity, and it goads us to track the widest possible range of 
enselfments found in a given agent or a group inhabiting a 
particular socio-historical niche (Shalin 2007).  Starting with the 
premise that social scientists draw on their personal experience 
when they select problems for investigation and articulate their 
research experience, biocritical inquiry highlights what the ancients 
called bios theoretikos– a life informed by principles and principles 
embodied in life.  Special attention is paid here to the manner in 
which historical agents integrate their vita activa, vita 
contemplativa, and vita voluptuosa.  Biocritique samples the agent’s 
discursive tokens, emotional offerings, and behavioral assays in an 
attempt to figure out how they hang together, what a given 
theoretical precept means in practical terms.  All along, the 
biocritical researcher remains mindful about the ever-changing gap 
between our words, emotions, and deeds.   
 
This perspective differs from the constitutive principles of 
psychology insofar as the latter postulates a core personality 
persisting across time and space.  Rather, biocritical hermeneutics 
focuses on the patterns of uncertainty and structures of 
indeterminacy manifest in human conduct continuously adjusted to 
social pressures and revealing human agency as the inexorably 
stochastic process (Shalin 1986:22).  An observation by Michel 
Montaigne, who explored his own life in a series of brilliant essays 
conceived as quasi-experiments, illuminates this perspective human 
agency: 
[A]ny one who turns his prime attention on to himself will hardly 
ever find himself in the same state twice. . . .  Every sort of 
contradiction can be found in me, depending on some twist or 
attribute:  timid, insolent; chaste, lecherous; talkative, taciturn; 
tough, sickly; clever, dull; brooding, affable; lying, truthful; learned, 
ignorant; generous, miserly and then prodigal – I can see 
something of all that in myself, depending on how I gyrate; and 
anyone who studies himself attentively finds in himself and in his 
very judgment this whirring about and this discordancy.  There is 
nothing I can say about myself as a whole simply and completely, 
without intermingling and admixture.  The most universal article of 
my own Logic is DISTINGUO (Montaigne 1987:377). 
Biocritical investigation starts with the premise that we gain 
knowledge about ourselves and society when we examine 
systematically the (mis)alignment between our words, actions, and 
emotions, along with the work done to realign our word-body-action 
nexus.  Biocritical hermeneutics invites a judicious second look at 
the fragments from which the master narratives spring with an eye 
to reconstructing a historically situated agency in its full stochastic 
flight.  Biocritical research relies on a kind of “reverse editing” that 
restores the redacted enselfments and reframes the overall self-
construction by cross-referencing the agent’s programmatic 
commitments with the available biographical records of their 
actions, feelings, and words.  By collecting biographical data and 
subjecting it to biocritical analysis, we can better understand how 
affectively ambivalent and situationally ambiguous occasions are 
framed into ready-to-hand accounts which, in turn, feed back into 
our conduct and emotion work.   
 
Epistemologically, biocritical hermeneutics takes its cue from early 
Heidegger who stressed the link between our moods and theoretical 
practices.  “It is precisely when we see the ‘world’ unsteady and 
fitfully in accordance with our moods, that the ready-to-hand shows 
itself in its specific moodhood, which is never the same from day to 
day. . . .  Yet even the purest theoria has not left all moods behind 
it. . . .  Indeed from the ontological point of view we must as a 
general principle leave the primary discovery of the world to ‘bare 
moods’” (1962:177).  This bold premise calls for a reexamination of 
the link between affect and discursive practices.  It also invites a 
fresh look at the hermeneutical circle which, as Heidegger 
(1962:195) warned us, “is not to be reduced to the level of vicious 
circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated, [for in this] 
circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of 
knowing.”  I take this to mean that, consciously or unconsciously, 
we insert ourselves into the hermeneutical circle and bring our 
affections and deeds into a social inquiry (Shalin 2007:220-
221).  Our theoretical constructs draw on the somatic-affective 
experience we bring to the research situation, just as the insights 
gleaned from the situation under study brings about reconstruction 
in our experience.   
 
Goffman’s methodological stance echoes this agenda.  We can see 
that in a talk that Goffman (2002) gave at the 1974 Pacific 
Sociological Association meeting where he described participant 
observation as a way of “getting data . . . by subjecting yourself, 
your own body and your own personality, and your own social 
situation, to the set of contingencies that play upon a set of 
individuals, so that you can physically and ecologically penetrate 
their circle of response to their social situation, or their work 
situation, or their ethnic situation, or whatever. . . .  That ‘tunes 
your body up’ and with your ‘tuned-up body’ and with the ecological 
right to be close to them (which you obtained by one sneaky means 
or another), you are in a position to note their gestural, visual, 
bodily response to what’s going on about them and you are 
empathetic enough because you have been taking the same crap 
they were taking – to sense what it is that they’re responding to” 
(Goffman 2002:125-126).  Such statements highlight the corporeal 
dimension and the empathetic nature of ethnographic inquiry.  First 
articulated by Charles Cooley (1909:27; Shalin 1986:18-22), this 
precept reminds us that the line separating the subject and object in 
ethnographic research is less than bright.  Field researchers gain 
knowledge by making local experiences their own, or as Goffman 
put it, “[Y]ou should feel you could settle down and forget about 
being a sociologist.  The members of the opposite sex should 
become attractive to you.  You should be able to engage in the 
same body rhythms, rate of movement, tapping of the feet, that 
sort of thing, as the people around you.  Those are the real tests of 
penetrating a group” (Goffman 2002:129).  Sharing one’s 
experience with the locals, bringing it to bear on the interpretation 
process is the reverse part of the same process, which demands 
more attention than it was given in Goffman’s work.    
 
The circle involved in this reasoning is not vicious but 
hermeneutical.  Seen from the vantage point of pragmatist 
philosophy, the hermeneutical circle draws into itself the 
researcher’s body and engages the participant observer’s 
emotions.  This is what Goffman appears to be going through when 
he put himself imaginatively in place of a con artist, an asylum 
patient, a stigmatized person, an undercover agent, a gambler 
hooked on risk taking, a lecturer staging a performance before an 
audience, or an association’s president preparing a talk he knows 
could be delivered only posthumously.  Participant observation 
pivots on self-reflexivity, on the ability to take the role of the 
other.  It also problematizes the scholar’s biographical experience, 
revealing the hermeneutical horizons within which the inquirer 
practices sociological imagination.  Such a stance can be traitorous, 
especially when practiced unwittingly, for it lures the inquiring agent 
into a historically grounded hermeneutical circle where it may 
“discover” exactly what it expects to find.  But this hermeneutical 
circle also contains what Heidegger called “a positive possibility of 
the most primordial kind of knowing.”   
 
Having being drawn into the pragmatically understood 
hermeneutical circle, the biocritic will face a host of ethical 
challenges.  Which information about the researcher’s private life 
should remain private and which belongs to public domain?  What if 
a scholar under biocritical scrutiny made special effort – as Erving 
Goffman did – to insulate his or her backstage from public 
scrutiny?  How far should we go protecting the innocent (or not so 
innocent) third parties from appearing in less than flattering 
lights?  How do we go about linking biographical tidbits to research 
practices and theoretical constructions? 
 
I now turn to the challenges confronting biocritical researchers and 
biographical resources available to students of Goffman’s life and 
work. 
The Ethics of Biocritical Exploration 
 
Those who have studied Goffman’s work observed a puzzling 
feature underlying his research practice:  the man who peered 
intently into other people’s backstage regions fiercely protected 
from scrutiny his own backstage.  As Judith Posner (2000:99-100) 
noted, “it seems strange when one realizes that while positing a 
reflective or introspective model of social behavior in his social 
analysis, [Goffman] has generally been so singularly non-reflective 
about himself. . . .  While he does not ‘give’ many messages about 
himself,” Posner continues, “he clearly ‘gives them off’.”  Goffman 
may inveigh against the “touching tendency to keep a part of the 
world safe from sociology” (Goffman 1972:152), but that does not 
mean he is willing to bring himself into the picture, whether as a 
researcher talking about his fieldwork practices or as a human being 
squaring off with his own interactive strategies.   
 
“Goffman was very secretive about his personal life,” Fine, Manning, 
and Smith (2000:x) remind us in their extensive review of 
Goffman’s work.   “[T]he executor of Goffman’s estate, abiding by 
his wishes, has closed his personal records to those who would 
investigate his life,” confirms Jaworski (2000:299).  Yves Winkin, a 
sociologist who made a concerted effort to study Goffman’s 
biography, corroborates this point:  “In Goffman’s case, it was clear 
that his privacy was jealously guarded.  He never gave interviews to 
the media, he never allowed his publishers to release pictures of 
him and he never appeared on television.  In November 1983, when 
I approached Gillian Sankoff, his widow and literary executor, I was 
politely acknowledged but was given no overt help (such as access 
to the archives). . . .  As Gillian Sankoff explained to me, Goffman 
wanted to keep his life totally separate from his work” (Winkin 
1999:19-20).  But can a scholar really keep one’s life completely 
separate from one’s work?   
 
The case was made to me on occasion by those who knew Goffman 
personally that his work stands or falls on its own, that in-depth 
knowledge of his personal life cannot help us build on Goffman’s 
insights and carry on his sociological tradition.  Moreover, interest in 
the scholar’s personal life risks turning prurient.  Vladimir 
Shlapentokh, an émigré Russian scholar who visited Goffman in 
Philadelphia and left a glowing account of that meeting, told me 
upon learning the nature of my interest:   
By many accounts, Dostoyevsky was a miserable man – 
mendacious, dishonest, prickly.  But as a reader, I can enjoy his 
books without going into his biography.  Indeed, I can enjoy his 
work all the better if I remain ignorant of his earthy self.  My wife 
Liuda read a recent [controversial] biography of [Boris] Pasternak, 
and she loved it.  But I refused to read it.  I am sure it is well 
written, but for me Pasternak is just a poet. . . .  As it turned out, 
my beloved Shopen was an anti-Semite.  So was [Franz] 
List.  Should I enjoy their music any less because of that? 
(Shlapentokh 2008). 
But there also is a body of opinion which rejects the notion that 
“nothing good can come from prying into people’s private lives, 
reading their correspondence, and interviewing their friends” 
(Jaworski 2000:299).  According to Winkin, “Once Goffman became 
a public figure he was, whether he chose to admit it or not, 
dispossessed of himself and of his privacy” (Winkin 1999:20).  In 
the same spirit, P.S. Strong lists several lessons Goffman 
bequeathed to us, one of which bears on the propriety of treating 
the researcher’s life as a resource:  “[Y]ou can treat your own life as 
data.  Each one of us is a natural control group; if our splendidly 
universal theories don’t even apply to our own lives, there must be 
something wrong with them. . . .  To treat one’s entire life as data is 
at one and the same time to dedicate oneself entirely to the 
discipline; to relentlessly combat ‘that touching tendency to keep a 
part of the world safe from sociology’ and to treat the whole life, 
including sociology, its works and homilies, as a resource for 
intellectual exploration” (Strong 2000:42, 41). 
 
I share these sentiments.  An inquiry into Goffman’s life and work 
strikes me as both legitimate and instructive.  Goffman is no 
candidate for sainthood, and I am not the devil’s advocate, just a 
researcher wondering if Goffman’s life can shed light on his 
dramaturgical sociology, and vice versa.  We can learn the strengths 
and weaknesses of sociological dramaturgy by examining how 
Erving conducted his research and signed himself in the 
flesh.  Clearly, we need to exercise the abundance of caution 
conducting a biocritical inquiry, handling information that Erving 
Goffman and those close to him might consider privileged.  As co-
director of the International Biography Initiative (see the reference 
section for URL), I grapple with such issues when I prepare for 
publication interviews recorded over the course of years with 
Russian social scientists and intellectuals.  Even when respondents 
gave every indication that their interviews or memoirs should enter 
the public domain, the question persists whether frank opinions and 
intimate details that surface in their narratives should be kept away 
from the public.  Those compiling an autobiography confront a 
similar set of narrative problems and ethical dilemmas.  Which 
biographical materials are to be redacted, how closely the edited 
truth must resemble messy realities, when the account offered to 
the public becomes self-serving, what is the proper balance of tact 
and frankness, of an overarching narrative unity and jarring self-
revelations?  Interviews and memoirs posted on the International 
Biography Initiative site are highly illuminating in this respect.  They 
show that Russian scholars seeking to reconcile their perestroika 
selves with their earlier soviet incarnations sometime willfully omit 
key events that cast their past identities and subsequent 
metamorphoses in more ambiguous light (Shalin 2006, 2008). 
 
Ives Winkin (1999:20) asks, “[D]o I have the right to invade his 
[Goffman’s] privacy?”  The answer is “yes,” provided the researcher 
is “well-intentioned as good literary standards permit.  There should 
be no stature crafting, but equally there should be no unnecessary 
unwrapping either” (Winkin 1999:20).  That does not sound like 
much of an advice (how much unwrapping is too much?) for those 
wading through the muddy waters of biocritique.  Still, we should 
heed the common sense appeal to tact.   
 
Be clear about your inquiry’s goal, highlight alternative 
interpretations, explore the potential sources of bias, consider the 
best and worst case scenarios, do as little harm as possible to the 
third parties, pay close attention to the historical circumstances and 
the ethical standards of the time – such are ethical guideposts I 
propose to follow in this biocritical inquiry.  We also need to bear in 
mind that biocritical accounts may reveal as much about the 
biocritic as about the object of biocritical investigation. 
 
Biographical Resources for the Erving Goffman Project 
 
One potential payoff from the Erving Goffman Project and the 
materials gathered in the Intercyberlibrary is that they force us to 
think systematically about the difficulties we encounter in evaluating 
the veracity and relevance of biographical data.  Much of what is 
available to biocritical researchers are second-hand accounts with 
unclear provenance.  Personal archives tend to be edited, 
sometimes heavily, to prevent the particularly unseemly information 
from reaching the posterity.  When the memoirist witnessed the 
reported event first-hand, the exact circumstances surrounding the 
encounter often remain obscure.  Witnesses neglect to describe the 
nature of their relationship with the person they reminisce 
about.  While conducting interviews and collecting memoirs for this 
project, I have also noticed that when I had a chance to talk to the 
same person twice, the informant occasionally offered discrepant, 
even contradictory, renderings of the same events.  The biocritics’ 
personal biases, the way they hear, record, and interpret the bio 
data, may further prejudice the story.   
 
It is all the more impressive when the memoirist provides the 
relevant particulars, explains the extent of one’s familiarity with the 
person in question, and discloses the potential sources of bias.  A 
good example is Robert Erwin who provides this brief but telling 
account of his encounters with Goffman: 
        I base my opinion of Goffman’s personality on three 
conversations I had with him as a publisher between 1967 and 
1979, on a couple of casual social encounters, and on stories told 
me by two friends and a person who dealt with him on academic 
business.   
        A number of people who knew him in person referred to him 
as sour and sardonic, although a minority objected to those 
labels.  The word I would use to characterize his personality is eerie. 
        During a year he spent at the Harvard Center for International 
Affairs, where I was then Editor of Publications, Goffman enrolled a 
child at the Cambridge school which one of my daughters was 
attending.   
        One sunny Saturday at a fund-raising fair at the school I 
discovered that the jazz quartet playing outside the Science Building 
included Edmond Hall, the superb Dixieland clarinetist.  Hall was old 
and down on his luck by the look of him, but he still had fast fingers 
and a mahogany tone.   
        Goffman came ambling along while I was listening.  As we 
carried on small talk about the fair, the school, and our offspring, I 
nodded and beamed at the music, making no secret of my 
exultation and veneration.  The more enthusiasm I showed, the 
more Goffman looked at me with dread, and in a little while he left 
like a miner escaping from a tunnel that may collapse at any 
minute.   
        Maybe I was ingenuous.  Maybe he was tone deaf.  Yet I could 
not help but think of the Wicked Witch in the Wizard of Oz, the one 
who would melt if you splashed water at her.  Dread is not too 
strong a word for what I felt in him.  He seemed to fear that to be 
splattered with joy would be lethal. (Erwin 2000:94)  
This reportage tells a story as well as provides the sense of time 
and place.  Most tales of Goffman circulating in the discipline are 
less specific.  It is left to the researcher to investigate the 
distribution of reported episodes, examine the possible reporting 
bias, and identify specific framing devices used to capture lived 
experience.  In other cases, the information about a particular 
episode comes second hand but the provider is fully aware of this 
fact, cites the source, and even offers a clue on how to verify the 
account.  The following example comes from Joel Best’s interview:   
The guy’s name is Alan Charles Kors, a historian at the University of 
Pennsylvania.  He is a big advocate for academic freedom, a 
professor studying the Enlightenment.  He told me a story about 
having gone to a dinner party where Goffman just eviscerated the 
hostess, saying something like, ‘Here are all those important people 
you gathered here – is this the best that you can do?’  I don’t 
remember all the details (Best 2007).    
We must exercise an abundance of caution dealing with hearsay, 
but it would be a mistake to disregard it altogether.  Much of what 
reaches us though history is just that.  We need to collate 
biographical tidbits from the sources of different provenance and 
veracity.  Even though such accounts may not rise above the level 
of hearsay, they offer valuable information.  This is how Lofland 
introduces the materials gathered for his fine biographical essay on 
Goffman: 
As is well known, Goffman was a complicated man who grew even 
more Gordian as he matured.  I knew only parts of him and in 
preparing for this gathering I have thought it important to seek the 
reflections of others who knew him and his work, the better to 
present a more complete and textured picture of his legacies.  With 
their permission, I drew frequently on the discerning and enlarging 
observations they have shared.  Their contributions are too 
important to relegate recognition to a footnote and I therefore 
indicate their names and my appreciation here:  Howard S. Becker, 
Bennett Berger, Herbert Blumer, Arlene Daniels, Fred Davis, Jason 
Ditton, Russell R. Dynes, Gary Allan Fine, William J. Good, Allen 
Grimshaw, Joseph Gusfield, Gary Hamilton, Arlie Hochschild, Dell 
Hymes, John Irwin, Edwin Lemert, Lyn H.  Lofland, Peter 
K.  Manning, Gary Marx, Marsha Rosenbaum, Anselm Strauss, and 
Harold Wilensky.  Despite their help, I surely select and elaborate 
those legacies that are most congenial to me and in which I believe 
most strongly.  I am certain that others would (and surely will) 
select and stress different inheritances (Lofland 2000/1983:156).   
It would be valuable indeed to collect all known tales of Goffman, 
including the raw interview data.  Assembled, double-checked, and 
cross-referenced, such data repository can yield a multi-dimensional 
portrait of Goffman the scholars, the teacher, the man.  As the work 
on the Erving Goffman Project lumbers along, it might be helpful to 
distinguish between 
1. Hearsay – tales about the person floating around without clear 
attribution.  
 
2. Anecdotes – stories traced to a particular source but not 
necessarily witnessed by the narrator.  
 
3. Episodes – single events witnessed by a narrator who did not 
play a major part in the encounter. 
 
4. Encounters – an interaction in which the narrator engaged in a 
focused interchange with the person in question. 
 
5. Transactions – a series of direct and indirect encounters 
stretching over a course of time and hinting at a pattern.  
 
6. Reputations – opinions about the person’s agency formed by 
specific narrators on the basis of personal observations, second 
hand accounts, and partial record.  
 
7. Evaluations – considered biocritical judgments about an 
embodied historical agent based on the personal accounts, 
institutional records, and other traces that the agent or a group of 
agents left behind.  
We might also need a term like biographical repertories to 
describe a range of biographical blueprints that gain currency in a 
historical group, strata, society, or era.  The notion of “biographem” 
(see Winkin 1999) suggests additional lines for biocritical 
investigation.  A specific tale may not fall squarely into either 
category, spanning several framing models, but the above schema 
might help assess its generic features.   
 
The would-be contributors to the Erving Goffman Project who 
witnessed Erving personally and have a tale to share can shed light 
on his physical appearance (e.g., estimates of Erving’s heights 
range between 5.2 and 5.6), his demeanor (e.g., his eagerness to 
reveal the other’s and conceal his own backstage), manner of dress 
(e.g., some remember him as a dapper, deliberate dresser while 
others recall him being casual about his clothes), as well as specific 
deeds that show the widest possible range of his enselfments (e.g., 
is the story about Goffman’s pointing to the inferiority of female 
grad student apocryphal?).   
 
Those interested in biocritical research on Erving Goffman have 
several sources at their disposal.  My own study draws heavily on 
the memoirs about Erving Goffman collected in volume one of the 
series edited by G. A. Fine, P. Manning, and G. W. H. Smith 
(2000).  Particularly valuable for the present endeavor were the 
biographical materials and interpretations gleaned from Lofland 
(2000/1983), Marx (2000/1984), MacCannell (2000/1983), and 
Winkin (1988, 1999, 2000/1992) – scholars who knew Goffman well 
and made an effort to link his life and work.  I found plenty of 
insights into Goffman’s corpus and its socio-historical underpinnings 
in the works of Berger (2000/1973), Gouldner (2000/1970), Hymes 
(2000/1984), Grimshaw (2000/1983), Strong (2000/1983), Posner 
(2000/1978), Fine (2000/1999), Greelan (2000/1984), Erwin 
(2000/1992), and Gonos (1980). 
 
This project also uses the interviews and memoirs I collected from 
Goffman’s students, colleagues, and friends whose reminiscences 
are gathered in the Intercyberlibrary.  Several interviews I recorded 
with those who knew Goffman are yet to be transcribed, edited, and 
posted on the web.  I wish to express my gratitude to Patti Adler, 
Howard Becker, Hans Becker, Joel Best, James Chriss, David 
Dickens, Gary Fine, Andy Fontana, David Franks, Ruth Horowitz, 
John Irwin, Melvin Kohn, John Lofland, Peter Manning, Gary Marx, 
Dean MacCannell, George Ritzer, Vladimir Shlapentokh, Alan Sica, 
Loic Waquant, and other scholars who responded to my initial 
inquiries and passed on to me their reminiscences about Erving 
Goffman. 
 
The Many Facets of Goffman’s Identity 
 
Goffman left an indelible impression on those who encountered him 
personally.  Everybody has something positive to say about 
Goffman the scholar, the teacher, the man.  He is remembered as 
“gentle” (Hymes 2000:59), “unusually modest” (Strong 2000:42), 
“kindly, hospitable” (Shlapentokh 2008), “a warm, friendly, modest, 
considerate man” (Bourdieu, 2000:4), “a steadfast and loyal friend . 
. . charming, clear, and sympathetic” (Grimshaw 2000:6), “hip, 
existential, cool . . . brilliant and learned” (Marx 2000:63-67), a 
“cheerful and graceful analyst in a world of tragedy and melancholy” 
(Lofland 2000:176), a scholar with a rare “genius for close 
observation” (MacCannell 2000:11). 
 
Even though most of these statements were first published as a 
tribute to Goffman immediately following his death and so are 
appropriately hagiographic, they hint at a different Goffman:  a 
“snide or disparaging individual” (Irwin 2007),  “a complicated man 
who grew ever more Gordian as he matured,” who “could be so 
exquisitely cruel” (Lofland 2000:156, 175), an “unusually complex 
[man with] a painful shyness which made him reject, sometimes 
rudely, strangers’ attempts at encounter initiation” (Grimshaw 
2000:6), “a detached, hard-boiled, intellectually cynic . . . mercurial 
character [with] the ability to shift selves,” a man showing “an 
almost sadistic pleasure in shaking up the reader or listener” and a 
weakness for “metaphors, which . . . in retrospect . . . seem cruel 
and tasteless” (Marx 2000:63-69), a man issuing a “steady stream 
of sarcasm” which earned him the nickname “little dagger” (Fine, 
Manning, and Smith 2000:x-xii). 
 
As Dean MacCannell put it, “Goffman was both friendly, modest, 
and considerate – and he could be mean as hell” (MacCannell 
2007).  People who knew Goffman well have sought to reconcile 
such contradictory strands in Goffman’s enselfments and explain 
their admiration for the man.  Says John Irwin, “Even though Erving 
could be a pain in the ass and sometimes cruel, my wife and I loved 
him because he was so smart, fascinating, entertaining, and 
occasionally kind” (Irwin, 2007).  Gary Marx invokes the image of 
“at least two Goffmans.  One was wise, warm, and of good humor, 
eager to impart knowledge via morality tales and specific advice and 
make the student feel like he or she was within the chosen circle of 
person in the know.  .  .  .  The other Goffman was controlled, 
insensitive, and indifferent and made sure the student knew his 
place.  Most of the ‘Tales of Goffman’ are negative.  In many of his 
dealings with others he did not reflect the sensitivity and concern 
for the underdog shown in his early written work” (Marx 
2000:67).  John Lofland captures “dialectical contradictions” in 
Goffman’s presentation of self especially well: 
He was a severe formal theorist yet a descriptive ethnographer; a 
reclusive scholar yet an adroit administrator and a rapier-witted 
party-goer; cynical yet sincere; an intellectual giant yet skeptical 
about his achievements; openly crass in promoting his self-interest 
yet rejecting broad and public self-promotion; brilliant at ferreting 
out social bluffs yet less than adept at bluffing; religious about 
scholarship yet cynical about social enterprises.  Most certainly he 
stripped away polite fictions in print and in person, yet also in print 
and in person had the deepest and most profound appreciation of 
the importance of ‘tact, graciousness, and compassion” (Lofland 
2000:176). 
Why would the man who is supposed to have acted “out of loyalty 
to all the beautiful losers who never made it” (Berger 2000:289) tell 
an assistant professor just denied tenure: “After all, all of us aren’t 
good enough to teach here” (Lofland 2000:167).  Those familiar 
with the account of “cooling the mark out” that Goffman gave in his 
famous 1952 article will be puzzled by this heedless violation of the 
interaction order.  Was the incident misreported? Did Goffman’s 
colleague do something to provoke this outrage? Perhaps the 
remark was delivered in a humorous fashion that reframed its 
meaning? On the face of it, such behavior has more to do with 
“heating the mark up” than with “cooling the mark out.” 
 
How could a scholar speaking so eloquently about the cruel way 
society stigmatizes its members tell a female student that “he did 
not think women should be in graduate school” or pointedly use 
derogatory terms like “gimps” when “there was a badly crippled 
woman in the class” (Marx 2000:67).  Notice that it was the same 
Goffman who published pioneering studies like Stigma (1963), “The 
Arrangements between the Sexes” (1977), and Gender 
Advertisements (1979).  It is hard to think Goffman was unaware of 
how his speech acts must have affected the people he stigmatized. 
Then, what was the pedagogical meaning of his harangues? 
 
What are we to make of an incident reported by Tom Scheff when 
he got sick on the airplane and tried discretely to do what nature 
required while “Goffman was laughing and narrating a blow-by-blow 
description of my behavior, describing my attempts to be polite as I 
was overcome by an irresistible impulse.  I felt doubly humiliated, 
not just because of my behavior, but also because I felt Goffman 
had mocked me” (Scheff 2006:10).  No effort to save face on 
Goffman’s part in this episode.  So what was the purpose of such 
conduct – hazing the underling, testing the novice, teaching a 
lesson about civil inattention? 
 
Or consider a report about Goffman passing through a hotel lobby 
at a sociology convention and casually remarking to a group of 
friends: “’If I can’t find anybody more important to talk with, I’ll 
come back and talk with you’.  A jaunty terrorist with a diffident 
voice reminding us that in this world’s bag full-to-bursting with 
banal sentiment,” observes Bennett Berger (2000:279), “anybody 
who says something cruel and true can’t be all bad.” “Rendering 
explicit the contraption,” as Victor Shklovsky called it, would seem 
to be the subtext of this incident. 
 
Here is one more example illuminating the persistent self-
referentiality in Goffman’s conduct.  It comes from Goffman’s 
“lecture about lecture” delivered at the University of Michigan in 
1976 where he mocked a typical lecturer who “in exchange for this 
song and dance, this stage-limited performance of approachability, 
this illusion of personal access . . . gets honor, attention, applause 
and a fee.  For which I thank you” (Goffman 1983c:194). 
 
We should bear in mind that participants often have different takes 
on the same events, with each account having some perchance on 
reality.  Also, there is probably a sampling bias in all memoir 
literature that tends to focus on the spectacular, the offbeat, and 
the negative and underreport the routine, the mundane, and the 
benign.  Here is a recollection by David Dickens, 2008) that shows 
Goffman’s different sides: 
During my last year of graduate school, in 1977 or 1978, I 
presented a paper on phenomenological sociology at a conference in 
Boston.  The session was chaired by Larry Wieder, a prominent 
ethnomethodologist.  Once the presentations concluded, a small 
unassuming man walked up to me, shook my hand and told me “I 
really enjoyed your paper.  It was very clear.” I thanked him and he 
then turned toward Larry, whom he seemed to know, and said 
“Larry, I didn’t understand a word you said.” Wieder, being the kind 
fellow that he was, simply chuckled and said, “Well, Erving, I’m 
sorry to hear that.” I still had no idea who the stranger was but, as 
he turned and walked away, Larry looked at me and said, “you 
should be very proud, that was Erving Goffman.”  
As this example shows, Goffman could be supportive and dismissive 
at the same time.  And he clearly showed the capacity for growth, 
both intellectually and personally.  Goffman might have been 
skeptical about women’s work in graduate school at the early stages 
of his career but later wrote papers on gender discrimination and 
institutional reflexivity, which must have been prompted in part by 
his reflections on his own role as a professor in the academe 
dominated by males.  He castigated mental institutions for the 
abusive treatment they gave their charges, following which he wrote 
a powerful account of what it is like to live with a disturbed person 
prone to violating the interaction order.  He pretty much ignored the 
role of the body in his early writings, notably in The Presentation of 
Self, then spoke eloquently about the pervasive effect that our 
bodily limitations and affective disturbances have on our 
conduct.  We might take these metamorphoses as a warning against 
the tendency to cherry pick evidence that accords with certain 
preconceptions and gloss over human agency’s inchoate 
properties.  Human agency is a stochastic phenomena marked by 
indeterminacy and contradiction. 
 
Still, when I hear about the “hazing” to which Goffman subjected 
those close to him (Lofland 2000:167; Scheff 2006:11), I cannot 
help thinking that such episodes are too numerous to ignore, 
especially when they concern a student-teacher relationship.  When 
we profess, we impart knowledge not only via discourse but also 
viscerally, through our embodied actions which provide a somatic-
affective backdrop against which our professed theoretical 
commitments loom larger or smaller.  That applies not only to 
Erving Goffman whose deeds and theories reveal a certain thematic 
(dis)continuity, but to all of us who aspire to profess and who, often 
in spite of ourselves, serve as vital links in the long semiotic chains 
of history.  Goffman’s abiding commitment to scholarship, 
seriousness of his intellectual pursuits, willingness to work closely 
with aspiring scholars are of signal importance, but so are the 
occasions where he exhibited a remarkable lack of emotional 
intelligence as evidenced by the tears to which he reduced his 
charges and humiliations he caused to those close to him. 
 
Goffman’s relationships with his students deserve a special 
attention.  In many cases, it seems, these relationships were 
marred by strain and ill-feelings.  All teacher-apprentice bonds tend 
to be fragile on account of the inevitable status disparity, signal 
crossing, only partially fulfilled promises.  Still, the number of 
Goffman’s students regaling their ambivalence and misgivings about 
the master seems unusually high.  
Tom Scheff, who notes that “as teacher and mentor, Goffman was 
generous and helpful,” tells about his disappointment when he 
travelled some distance to consult Goffman on his project only to be 
dismissed in a rather summary fashion – “he cut me off abruptly 
after hearing only a few minutes of my observation and confusion” 
(Scheff 2006:8-13).  Joel Best (2007) recalls how he went to 
Goffman’s office to inquire about the project he tried to model on 
his teacher’s writing “in a sense that it had examples from fiction, 
newspaper articles, and so on . . . and he gave me a B+ on the 
paper.  He told me, ‘It is really hard to do that kind of thing 
well.’ And that was about all the advice I ever got from him.”  John 
Irwin (2007) recounts a similar story about a paper he turned over 
to Goffman who ”coldly informed me that he would not work with 
me on a Ph.D. . . .   I didn’t have much contact with Goffman for 
the next two years.  When I put together a group of professors to 
serve as my orals’ committee, which had to pass on my mastery of 
several chosen areas of sociology before I could go on to my last 
task, the dissertation, I purposely left him off because I heard he 
gave one of the other graduate students I knew a lot of trouble 
during his orals.”  
Particularly jarring in this respect is a story reported by Emanuel 
Schegloff (1992).  It concerns the dissertation of Harvey Sacks on 
whose dissertation committee Goffman served and whose particular 
line of argument he questioned.  This is how Schegloff reports the 
incident: 
The upshot was that Goffman found the argument of “An initial 
investigation.  .  .” circular, and no amount of discussion could 
move him from this view.  Nor would he, for quite a while, step 
aside from the committee to allow its other members to act 
favorably on the dissertation, as they wished to do.  Eventually, 
however, he agreed to do so, largely at the urging of Aaron Cicourel 
who, in the end, signed the dissertation as Chair of its sponsoring 
committee, making possible the awarding of the Ph.D. in 1966 
(Schegloff 1992: xxiv). 
This account seems incomplete to me, as it elides the substance of 
the disagreement, but it is troublesome – especially given the hard 
time Goffman faced trying to convince his own dissertation advisors 
at the university of Chicago to give him a pass on his 
unconventional Ph.D. thesis.  If Schegloff’s rendering is correct, 
Goffman did appear to cross the line separating quirkiness from 
obstinacy in this particular case.  Such bad faith explains caustic 
remarks his students occasionally make about their 
mentor.  Recalling “the fight with Goffman” that he and Sacks 
carried on and that some might have mistaken for the oedipal urge 
to slay one’s intellectual father, Schegloff observes that the animus 
was coming from the other end:  “It was Sacks, actually, who 
remarked once that we nowadays think of Oedipus story as a story 
about patricide, but that it was in the first instance, of course, a 
case of intended infanticide .  .  .  it was his father who first left 
Oedipus to die, and not the other way around” (Schegloff 
1988:91).   
 
This story had a characteristic twist.  When asked if Sacks was his 
student, Goffman once allegedly answered:  “‘What do you mean; I 
was his student!’” (Schegloff 1992:xxiii).  This episode is indicative 
of Goffman’s ability to shift shapes without the willingness to 
explain himself, to connect his past and present enselfments and 
square off with the ethical implications of his deeds.  Goffman will 
not be contained; whatever frame he was about to impose on the 
situation and himself, he would find the way to undercut one way or 
another.   
 
Several explanations have been proffered to make sense of 
Goffman’s inconsistencies and contradictions.  John Irwin invokes 
Goffman’s view that “anyone departing from an ideal of the tall, 
blond haired, blue-eyed handsome or beautiful individual” was 
stigmatized, and as someone lacking in some such attributes, 
Goffman was bound to carry a stigma and occasionally act it out: 
“[B]eing a short Jew in worlds dominated by tall ‘goyem’ – he was 
pissed off and this shaded all of his perceptions and analysis” (Irwin 
2007).  Peter Manning makes a similar point: “I think the quotes 
from Miss Lonelyhearts are ‘deep Goffman’” (Manning-Shalin 
2007).  Mel Kohn is more cautious in his judgment, but he believes 
that Goffman was self-conscious about his physical stature (Kohn 
2008).  Dell Hymes invokes Goffman’s marginalized childhood to 
explain his harsher side, citing in particular these Goffman’s words: 
“I grew up (with Yiddish) in a town where to speak another 
language was to be suspect of being homosexual” (Hymes 
2000:56).  Paul Greelan brings up “theBook of Job [which] may 
have exerted a profound influence on Goffman,” reconstructing the 
evolution of Erving’s writing as mirroring the stages of moral growth 
from innocence to wisdom undergone by the biblical Job (Greelan 
2000:126).  Tom Scheff highlights the “cult of masculinity” that 
Goffman deftly analyzed in his paper “Where the Action Is,” 
suggesting that “this idea might help to understand some of his 
personal life.  Goffman seems to have treated his contacts with me 
and others as ‘action.’ His persona in these encounters maintaining 
‘composure, poise, and control of his emotions,’ was not just 
masculine but hypermasculine” (Scheff 2006:13).  I am intrigued by 
the parallels between Goffman’s demeanor and the ironic vigil that 
Russian intellectuals held in response to the oppression and abusive 
treatment they faced in their native land, from which Erving’s 
parents hailed (Shalin 1996, 2005).  It would be interesting to find 
out, also, if Goffman was familiar with a story known to all educated 
Russians, Ward No.6, in which Anton Chekhov painted a gruesome 
picture of an asylum where patients, with or without metal health 
symptoms, were kept against their will in prison-like conditions. 
 
Perhaps the boldest interpretation of Goffman’s conduct comes from 
Dean MacCannell who reads Goffman’s life as a deliberate effort to 
combat bad faith that Sartre decried in his existentialist philosophy: 
If we list the various claims (both substantiated and the other kind) 
that have been made against Goffman – cynical, ironical, 
duplicitous, deceptive, unserious, nonresponsive – we find they are 
also the key terms in Sartre’s analysis of ‘bad faith’.  It seems that 
Goffman took Sartre so much to heart that he assembled a persona 
for himself exactly on the model of ‘Sartrean bad faith’, perhaps in 
the belief that a double negative makes a positive, that is, if he 
could only mock up bad faith maybe he, at least, could escape the 
determinism he describes so well.  Certainly there is evidence in his 
comportment that Goffman was more concerned than anyone else 
about the implications of his theory (MacCannell, 2000:13). 
Something is definitely to be said about casting Goffman as a 
practicing existentialist who takes upon himself to combat bad faith 
by overextending vapid behavioral and narrative idioms.  There is a 
tinge of Nietzsche here as well, the will to turn one’s life into a work 
of art.  Clearly Goffman systematically and intentionally violated the 
interaction rituals that he so painstakingly described in his 
publications, notably in his presidential address (Goffman 1983b), 
and he probably did so with a strategic and pedagogic end in 
mind.  I wonder, though, if a more mundane explanation might 
work here as well, the one that brings to mind the quote from 
Goffman taken as an epigraph for this paper: 
In these matters, American Hippies, and later, “The Chicago Seven,” 
were interesting amateurs; the great terrorists of contact forms 
were the mid-17th century Quakers of Britain.  .  .  .  That sturdy 
band of plain speakers should always stand before us as an example 
of the wonderfully disruptive power of systematic impoliteness, 
reminding us once again of the vulnerabilities of the interaction 
order.  There is no doubt: Fox’s disciples raised to the monumental 
heights the art of becoming the pain in the ass (Goffman 
1983b:13). 
Goffman’s abusive habits, it seems to me, betray a person who has 
been abused and who passes his trauma to those around him.  In 
this reckoning, Goffman is a person struggling to rid himself of the 
incivility and repression he encountered and wittingly or unwittingly 
absorbed during his formative years.  Goffman’s research agenda 
could have been influenced by his struggle to assert his dignity, 
move up in the social hierarchy, overcome the stigmatizing 
experience of his childhood and youth (consider in this context his 
remark to Dell Hymes).  Hence, his preoccupation with 
appearances, stigmatization, and passing persisting throughout his 
intellectual career, as well as the impostor complex ingrained in his 
dramaturgical preoccupation with the con artist's craft. 
 
None of these explanations is self-evident, neither excludes the 
others, yet they all point to a linkage between Goffman’s life and 
work. 
Intersection of Biography and Theory 
 
Of particular interest in this respect is information that Mel Kohn 
shared with me in a personal communication on January 11, 2008, 
where he recounted the years he worked with Goffman at the 
National Institute of Mental Health.  The budding scholars spend a 
fair amount of time together.  Goffman’s initial interest in psychiatry 
and mental institutions, according to Kohn, could have been linked 
to his wife’s situation.  Angelica Schuyler Choate, whom Goffman 
married in 1950, had serious mental health problems.  Well before 
Goffman left for Berkeley, she sought psychiatric help, “she already 
saw a therapist when he was at St. Elizabeth’s.”  Sky, which was 
Goffman’s wife nickname, underwent several institutionalizations, 
the experience that must have left an indelible mark on Goffman 
who was clearly unhappy about her experience with 
psychiatry.  Goffman’s take on mental institutions at the time he 
started his fieldwork in St. Elizabeth’s Hospital seems to reflect his 
personal circumstances.  The situation was further exacerbated by 
the couple’s marital problems.  According to Kohn, Angelica did not 
immediately follow Erving to Berkeley when Herbert Blumer had 
offered him a job in 1958.  She stayed behind with her son for 
about a year before joining Goffman.  The impression that Kohn and 
his colleagues at the Institute of Mental Health formed at the time 
was that this separation had to do with marital difficulties.  Kohn is 
careful to problematize his conclusions, pointing out that his 
information came to him second-hand:  “We all assumed this [the 
fact that his wife did not at first join Goffman at Berkeley] had to do 
with the strain in their marriage.  We might have learned this from 
people who knew both of them better.  But I knew of nothing [in 
particular].  She did not have a job.  My assumption might have 
been informed by those who knew the situation.”   
 
In 1964, right after Angelica was released from a mental institution, 
she committed suicide by jumping off the bridge.  That her 
husband’s role in the deinstitutionalization movement might have 
hastened Angelica’s demise offers a harrowing gloss on the 
situation.  It also presages a shift in Goffman’s perspective on 
mental illness.  Goffman’s personal and painful encounter with 
psychiatry appears to inform his early work on mental 
institutions.  Here is Mel Kohn again:  
All I know is that he was not happy with psychiatry. . . .  Erving 
Goffman was furious – yes, he was angry sometimes – he was 
furious that psychiatrists generally and mental hospital psychiatrists 
in particular applauded his work.  He had meant to show those 
bastards up.  He was fighting them.  And everybody attributed this 
to his wife’s therapy and his hating psychiatrists.  When he wrote 
“Moral Career of Mental Patient” – even though he never said so 
himself – all of us thought, “Aha, if I had not got those bastards 
with mental hospital as a total institution, then I’m really gonna give 
it to them now.  Isn’t it wonderful?”  (Kohn 2007).  
It is impossible to prove the link between Goffman’s personal 
circumstances and his professional interest in total institutions 
without access to Goffman’s archives, but the available materials 
provide ample food for this conjecture.  Think about the disdain 
Goffman showed toward psychiatry in the 1950’s.  It is palpable 
in Asylum where he asserted without reservation that “the ‘mentally 
ill’ . . . and mental patients distinctly suffer not from mental illness, 
but from contingencies,” that “the craziness or ‘sick behavior’ 
claimed for the mental patient is by and large a product of the 
claimant’s social distance from the situation that the patient is in, 
and is not primarily a product of mental illness” (Goffman 
1961:135, 130).  Following the tragic death of his wife, Goffman 
was less likely to put “metal illness” in quotation 
marks.  Grudgingly, he comes around to admit the somatic roots of 
mental illness, even though he declined to amend his earlier 
position explicitly:  “Whatever the cause of the offender’s 
psychological state – and clearly this may sometimes be organic – 
the social significance of the disease is that its carrier somehow hits 
upon the way that things can be made hot for us” (Goffman 
1971:389).  There are indications that Goffman was aware about 
the need to fine-tune his perspective.  According to David Mechanic, 
“Later in Goffman’s life, after he had to live through an episode of 
mental illness involving another person close to him, he is said to 
have remarked that had he been writing Asylums at that point, it 
would have been a very different book” (Mechanic 1989:150). 
 
The intersection between Goffman’s theory and biography 
illuminates a potential weakness in his dramaturgical analysis.  I am 
talking about his early tendency to disembody human agency, to 
equate face with mask, his believe that “this mask is our truer self” 
(Goffman, 1961:19).  On several occasions Goffman tells his 
readers that everyday life differs from theater, that there is no 
hiatus between the audience and performers in the real world where 
we find ourselves embedded as actors, stage managers, and 
onlookers at the same time.  Seminal as this observation is, it does 
not go far enough in separating the make-belief-world of theater 
from the flesh-and-blood world of everyday life where real blood 
flows, humiliations endured, fortunes made, kingdoms rise and 
fall.  Expressive and instrumental qualities that Erving strategically 
separated in his theory are intertwined in our mortal lives.  A failed 
task or a job well done may be supremely expressive, just as it 
could be singularly helpful in sorting out participants’ competing 
self-claims.  In everyday life we constantly check other people’s 
(and our own) self-claims against whatever we are prepared to sign 
in the flesh – behaviorally and affectively.  The notion that “[t]he 
world, in truth, is a wedding” (Goffman 1959:36) has a nice ring to 
it, but as every metaphor, it can be overextended.  A theory 
according to which “the person’s face clearly is something that is 
not lodged in or on the body but rather something that is diffusely 
located in the flow of events in the encounter” (Goffman, 1967:7) 
clues us to the social dimension of our existence, but it also tends to 
gloss over the fact that our faces are embedded not only in social 
settings but also in our somatic frames, that the face is a window 
through which we gaze at our corporeal being.  Goffman’s 
contention that our “body merely provide[s] a peg on which 
something of collaborative manufacture will be hung for a time” 
(Goffman 1959:253) runs the risk of disembodying our existence 
and downgrading the resources available to us in everyday life 
where we can tolerably settle questions of authenticity. 
 
The impression management technique focuses on the qualities 
amenable to semiotic control, susceptible to simulation and 
dissimulation.  Semiotic resources of the body are vast indeed, but 
they are not limitless.  Not all body indicia can be stage-
managed.  You cannot sit at the piano for an improvisation, take a 
bar exam on the fly, stand your ground in a dog fight, or argue 
gracefully in a high-stake debate – unless you have the right stuff, 
the hard-acquired habitus.  The ceremonial skills we deploy at a 
wedding will not get us far in the operating room or on a dance 
floor.  Talking the talk is one thing, walking the walk is another, and 
rocking the rock is something else altogether.  You can fake an 
orgasm, but it is hard to simulate a hard-on, or dissimulate it, for 
that matter.  Much of our life is embodied, substantive, and 
instrumental in a way that anonymous encounters in the elevator or 
chance meetings on the streets are not.  The fact that Goffman 
chose to separate the substantive content of social conduct from its 
expressive properties limits the reach of the interaction order theory 
(See Blumer 2000).   
 
The dramaturgical analysis zeroes in on “the expressive costume 
that individuals are expected to wear whenever they are in the 
immediate presence of others” (Goffman 1967:133).  Productive as 
such a focus proved to be, it obscures important dimension of social 
interaction, the embodiment-disembodiment-reembodiment arc 
distinguishing social practice.  Goffman astutely points out how a 
waiter displays a snappy front in the hopes of earning better tips, a 
plumber surreptitiously takes off his glasses to protect his manly 
image, and a prostitute spends extra time validating a customer’s 
self-image.  But he does not square off with the fact that the poor 
food quality and untimely delivery will ultimately trump the 
expressive finesse, that the plumber will earn respect by stopping 
the leak, and that ego-stroking is not the only skill bearing on a sex 
worker’s performance.  
Goffman’s Affective Spread 
 
One more biocritically significant facet of Goffman’s research 
agenda deserves to be mentioned here, however briefly.  It 
concerns the affective halo surrounding his theory.  The range of 
emotions found in Goffman’s writings is quite narrow (Scheff 
2006).  You will not find there any treatment of love, joy, or 
contentment.  The master emotion in Goffman’s corpus is 
“embarrassment” and its permutations.  When Goffman compares 
family dynamics to Cold War or imbues street interactions with 
harmful implications, he may project unto the world his own 
affective proclivities, generalize the experience that is less than 
universal. 
 
“I hope it is not inappropriate to speak about Goffman’s anger,” 
writes Dell Hymes (2000:56].  “At least it is partly in terms of anger 
that I made sense of him myself [of his] rudeness, his-game-
playing, his invention of inviolable rules of which one had not 
hitherto heard” (Hymes 2000:56).  “A number of people who knew 
him in person referred to him as sour and sardonic, although a 
minority objected to those labels,” observed Robert Erwin 
(2000:94).  “The word I would use to characterize his personality is 
eerie.  .  .  .  Dread is not too strong a word for what I felt in 
him.  He seemed to fear that to be splattered with joy would be 
lethal.” Indeed, it is hard to avoid the impression that Goffman’s 
live performances bear witness to certain somatic-affective 
undercurrents of his personal existence.  We can sense that when 
he storms out of the classroom after an African-American student 
queried him about the political implications of his thought (Marx 
2000:67), loses his temper with Marvin Scott during a scholarly 
exchange (Becker 2007), or tells his dinner companions what slobs 
they are (Lofland 2000:167). 
 
Clearly, there were lighter moments coexisting with the darker 
ones:  “Even though Erving could be a pain in the ass and 
sometimes cruel, my wife and I loved him because he was so smart, 
fascinating, entertaining, and occasionally kind.  He brightened up 
our lives” (Irwin 2007).  It is a question of balance.  Gauging the 
affective halo surrounding Erving through different stages of his life 
cycle and the manner in which it might have been reflected in his 
work is a potentially fruitful avenue for research.  My preliminary 
study of affective markers in Goffman’s corpus shows that the 
emotionally loaded indicators in his early works come chiefly from 
the anger and fear families of emotions (the methodological 
foundations of this study are discussed in Shalin 2006).  
The Hermeneutical Horizons of Goffman’s Imagination 
 
While Goffman is aware of this methodological agenda, he does not 
fully square off with the fact that social researchers in general and 
participant observers in particular draw on the expertise they 
acquire as members of society.  Consider the following observation 
that appears in Forms of Talk: 
The sexual moan.  This subvocal tracking of the course of sexually 
climactic experience is a display available for both sexes, but said to 
be increasingly fashionable for females – amongst whom, of course, 
the sound tracing can be strategically employed to delineate an 
ideal development in the marked absence of anything like the real 
thing (Goffman 1983c:106). 
Goffman’s works are replete with the observations that presuppose 
Goffman’s exposure to the relevant experience or vouch for his 
willingness to trust his contemporaries to supply the meaning of the 
reported activity.  However, the exact source of Goffman’s 
knowledge about the “real thing” and the “faked one” and the 
empirical indicators thereof are rarely spelled out.   
. . . 
The Theoretical Implications of Goffman’s Embodied Practice 
 
The purpose of this brief exploratory paper was to show that 
Goffman’s theoretical corpus can be profitably studied in light of his 
biographical corpus.  As one can gather from this discussion, I am 
trying to convince myself as much as I am straining to explain this 
project to my colleagues and would-be participants in the Erving 
Goffman Project.  I end my discussion with reflections on the 
lessons that biocritical analysis can teach us about Goffman’s life 
and work, the lessons that are tentative in the extreme and that 
should be treated as hypotheses rather than definitive conclusions. 
 
1.  The interaction order is hard to pin down: boil it down to a few 
fast rules, and you will see that those are honored in the breach as 
often as they are not.  The exception only confirms the rule, goes 
the old saw of which Goffman makes a frequent use, but how 
pervasively must the rule be violated before it becomes an 
exception and how often the exception is to occur before it becomes 
a rule?  Displaying requisite selves, protecting other people’s faces, 
maintaining proper affect, remedying situational infractions – there 
is hardly an interaction ritual that Goffman would not violate when 
the opportunity presented itself.  This is not to say that the 
interaction order is a figment of our imagination, only that it is 
indefinitely flexible and that its power to constrain is perennially 
problematic.  It is less of a ceremony than a semi-chaotic order that 
keeps emerging in fits and starts without ever solidifying into a 
reality sui generis.   
 
2.  Goffman’s theory of interaction order glosses over the issues of 
power which inform much of our interactive strategies.  If Goffman 
was able to get away with repeated violations of conventional 
etiquette, it is in large measure because he wielded vast power in 
the academic world that compelled those he offended to swallow 
their pride and back off in the face of his in-your-face 
performances.  Even Dell Hymes, an eminent scholar in his own 
right, preferred to ignore Goffman’s “invention of inviolable rules of 
which one had not hitherto heard” (Hymes 2000:56) rather than 
challenge Erving on making frivolous calls.  Those in power and 
authority can get away with violating the rules the rest of us may 
decline to challenge openly.  The fact that Goffman’s students 
frequently bore the brunt of his off-putting demeanor is indicative in 
this respect. 
 
3.  To an appreciable if hard to gauge extent, sociological inquiry is 
grounded in biographical circumstances.  As Nietzsche (1966:13) 
once observed, “every great philosophy so far has been .  .  .  the 
personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and 
unconscious memoir.” That Goffman is a great sociologist seems 
clear enough, and as the above discussion suggests, Goffman’s 
somatic-affective experience fed his sociological imagination.  While 
most of us are content to straddle a discourse and remain within the 
folds of the reigning orthodoxy, the great minds like Goffman’s are 
able to get out of the discourse machine and ride an emotion 
towards a new paradigmization.  As any historical agent, Goffman is 
constrained by the grand frameworks making round in his time – 
“sociological reality sui generis,” “structural imperatives,” or 
“syntactic rules of grammar,” but he puts them to a decidedly novel 
use.  The insights Goffman has to offer are personal; they are sifted 
through the affective filter that informs his ethnographic sensibilities 
and colors his conceptual innovations.  While such insights may be 
biased and thus need to be corrected, they often have a visceral 
truth to them that owes much to Goffman’s willingness to insert 
himself into the hermeneutical circle and allow his affective compass 
to guide his inquiry.   
 
4.  Goffman’s theories elide certain emotions in part because he had 
troubles experiencing particular affective states.  If his formulations 
sometimes evince the uneasiness about the bodily dimension of 
social interaction, it is in part because he felt ambivalent about his 
own corporeal dimensions and embodied qualities.  As several 
commentators point out, Goffman’s take on stigmatized agency 
implicated his own embodied being.  A master of ceremony, 
Goffman felt more comfortable communicating the niceties of social 
etiquette and expressive behavior than articulating the substantive, 
exchange-based transactions in which social life is grounded and 
which serve as a check on our expressive claims.   
 
5.  The dramaturgical analysis tends to gloss over the embodied 
dimensions of social interaction, to downplay the instrumental and 
the substantive in relation to the expressive and the 
communicative.  The Durkheimean insistence on social reality as a 
phenomenon sui generis is partially to blame for this 
weakness.  This emphasis played a crucial role in circumscribing 
sociology as a separate disincline, but policing its borderlines and 
fending off the encroachment from neighboring disciplines like 
biology, physiology, psychology, and psychiatry had an unintended 
consequence of delimiting the scope of sociological investigation and 
discouraging interdisciplinary research.  No doubt society informs 
the somatic-affective phenomena, but its reach is powerfully 
checked by the corporeal and neurological resources of the body 
that cannot be dramatized away and that shape social dynamics 
according to the logic of their own.  When psychic events come to 
our attention, we should not assume that they are necessarily 
psycho-logical.  By the same token, social phenomena are not 
automatically and exclusively socio-logical.  The bio-social 
continuum calls for an analysis that undermines the bureaucratic 
imperative of adhering to the disciplinary logic sui generis. 
 
6.  The range of behavioral and emotional enselfments we glean 
from Goffman life invites us to conceptualize human agency and 
personhood in a pragmatist key that escape the confines of the 
traditional psychological formulations.  Psychologists start with the 
premise that our feelings, actions, and thoughts reflect relatively 
stable, predictable personality patterns persisting over time and 
manifesting themselves across situations.  Psychological testing 
tends to privilege tools that reveal enduring traits and discriminate 
against personal qualities which attest to the volatility of our actions 
and sentiments.  From the vantage point of pragmatist 
hermeneutics, such indeterminacy is a normal reflection of 
conflicting social pressures.  Human beings are conceived here as 
nonclassically propertied objects akin to particles in micro 
physics.  When we don’t look at a particle, it is everywhere at once, 
it is a bundle of probabilities that requires a measurement event to 
materialize as a particle with a definite mass, position, momentum, 
and other properties.  In a similar fashion, our affect continuously 
and subconsciously scans the world for saliency; it generates 
conflicting feelings, it is pulled in different directions at once, and it 
takes a specific occasion – a personal encounter, a request to fill a 
survey, a need to take a public stance – for a human agent to adopt 
a specific emotional attitude called for in a given 
culture.  Predictable though such an attitude might be, it is only a 
matter of probability that a person will show this or that affective 
stance in any given situation. 
 
7.  Biocritical inquiry raises ethical issues concerning privacy, 
hearsay, gossip mongering, and general propriety of exploring 
historical personae who have explicitly or tacitly eschewed 
publicity.  It also puts into a spotlight the biocritic’s biases, 
agendas, and framing preferences.  Those looking into other 
people’s backstage regions must be ready to grant access to 
theirs.  The question is how we can conduct biocritical and 
autobiocritical investigations with both tact and verve, expose 
hearsay for what it is while making the most of it.  Plutarch built his 
work around gossip but after he strained all the hearsay through the 
sieve of his wisdom and experience, it congealed into Lives, one of 
the key sources in the Western cannon.  Comparing the ancient and 
modern ways of biocritical construction is something we should do, 
with the pragmatist perspective on meaning as an embodied 
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